Several microfinance organizations have begun using a management tool, developed by Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services (AIMS) at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to assess impact. This tool recommends comparing veteran members to new members of a microcredit program, and attributes any difference to the impact of the program. The tool introduces a potential source of bias into estimates of impact by not instructing organizations to include program dropouts in their calculations. This paper uses data from a longitudinal study in Peru of Mibanco borrowers and non-borrowers to quantify some, but not all, of the biases in the cross-sectional approach.
Introduction
Microfinance institutions receive tremendous amounts of development aid and publicity.
1 Studying the impact of such programs always has been a critical question from both a policy perspective (e.g.,
should funds be allocated to such programs) as well as a monitoring perspective (e.g., is a particular organization achieving its mission). In an attempt to conduct impact evaluations with limited resources, some organizations now use a cross-sectional empirical methodology (hereinafter referred to as the This paper will quantify the direction and magnitude of this effect by comparing the results from the standard tool to those obtained using a slight but important change: we include dropouts in the analysis.
We refer to this approach as the "recalculated cross-sectional approach." It is important to note this recalculation removes only one of several potential sources of bias. The point of this paper, therefore, is not to estimate the impact of a program, but rather to provide an empirical example of the consequence of ignoring the biases inherent in a cross-sectional impact assessment for microfinance institutions.
1 CGAP, the association of donor agencies investing in microfinance, estimates in its Donor Guidelines on Good Practice in Microfinance that the donor community spends US$800 million -$1 billion per year on microfinance. 2 Note that these studies, in particular Copestake et al (2001) and Noponen (2005) , employ a triangulation of methodologies, only one of which is the cross-sectional approach discussed in detail here.
Here, following a suggestion from Karlan (2001) we demonstrate a method to improve upon the cross-sectional approach by adding program dropouts to the analysis: rather than comparing those who have been in the program for two years (veterans) to those who just entered, we compare those who joined two years ago (veterans and dropouts) to those who just entered. Of course, many biases still exist;
we do not recommend this approach as a tool for measuring impact. However, since the cross-sectional approach is a popular tool we put forward this modification as an important improvement to improve the accuracy of the measurements.
To measure dropout bias, we use a longitudinal dataset to produce cross-sectional impact results, as the AIMS tool would recommend, and then we recalculate impact on a dataset that includes dropouts. In several cases, we find that correcting the sample frame by including the dropouts lowers the estimated impact. This could be because those who are made worse off from participating drop out of the program or perhaps because the poor are more likely to drop out of the program. Either way, the cross-sectional impact strategy upwardly biased impact. Section 2 summarizes the biases discussed in Karlan (2001) .
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 analyzes the data using first the cross-sectional approach (without accounting for dropout), and then with the recalculated cross-sectional approach (after correcting for dropout). This section also examines whether evidence exists to support other assumptions inherent in the cross-sectional methodology, such as the requirement that selection criteria (whether by the lender or by individual self-selection) do not change over time. Section 5 concludes and makes policy recommendations.
Impact Assessment and the Perils of the Cross-Sectional Approach
The fundamental goal of any impact assessment is to estimate the effect of an intervention in relationship to the counterfactual-what would have happened in the absence of the intervention. A common technique to achieve this is to compare program participants to a group of similar nonparticipants. The difficulty is to find groups that are sufficiently comparable. With most impacts assessments in microfinance, the major hurdle is that the treatment group was self-selected. If unobservable characteristics, such as entrepreneurial spirit, also cause an individual to choose to borrow, any observed differences in outcomes between borrowers and non-borrowers will be biased. The best way to solve this is through a randomized controlled trial, which ensures that the treatment group, on average, is identical to the control group except for the impact of the intervention, as in Karlan and Zinman (2006) . However, outside of a specialized field experiment we do not generally observe MFIs randomly giving credit to some members of a community. of non-governmental organizations that support microfinance), developed a set of low-cost tools for practitioners to use to study impact (Nelson and Garber 2001) . Examples of these tools include a client exit survey and a tool to measure the use of loans, profits, and savings over time. While these tools may provide important feedback to the microfinance institution, one major drawback of these types of studies is the lack of a control group of non-borrowers, meaning that the entire sample has self-selected into the treatment group. Without a control group of non-borrowers, we cannot say if credit is beneficial, in general, or if it merely appears successful because it has been given to the most entrepreneurial people.
One of these tools, the cross-sectional impact assessment, attempts to solve this problem by comparing veteran borrowers of a microcredit program to incoming clients that have yet to receive loans.
The stated justifications for the cross-sectional approach are twofold: (1) since both veteran borrowers and new borrowers are self-selected into the program, evaluators can avoid the selection bias inherent in comparing clients to non-clients; (2) the evaluation will be less costly since all analysis is performed on existing clients only, not on a control group of non-clients. Karlan (2001) On the other hand, the most successful entrepreneurs may 'graduate' from the program. In this case, the cross-sectional methodology underestimates the impact. Which is right? We cannot say, but fortunately there is a relatively simple fix which works either way: include the dropouts in the treatment group. The next section of this paper will explain how to do that.
Attrition Bias
Suppose for the moment that the program has no impact whatsoever, neither positive nor negative, on any participant. Yet some individuals drop out and others remain. If the rich are more likely to leave (perhaps the weekly meetings are more costly to them than they are to the poor), then the cross-sectional approach will underestimate the impact. The story behind this is different than the incomplete sample problem, but the net result is the same: the sample composition of the treatment and control groups is fundamentally different because the treatment group does not include those who left, whereas the control group includes those who will eventually leave. The solution is the same as for the incomplete sample problem: include the dropouts in the treatment group.
Timing of Decision Problem
Why does someone join a credit program now rather than 2 years ago? We do not know, but we intuit that there is a reason, and it is significant. We will examine this in the empirical analysis of this paper by comparing the two groups of individuals from the same baseline survey: (a) individuals who joined two years ago (at the time of the baseline survey), and (b) individuals who did not join two years ago, but did join by the time of the follow-up survey.
The empirical analysis is necessary in order to address several conceptual problems. Imagine that individuals join after coming to an epiphany that they must grow their business in order to pull themselves out of poverty. Or perhaps participants join when everyone in their household is healthy, and hence does not need constant care in the home. If ample opportunities exist for credit and savings in their community, then attributing the improvement in their lives to the microfinance institution could be erroneous. Their epiphany or their family's health may be the causal agent that led to the improved welfare, not the access to that particular source of credit.
One way to address this problem is to analyze the alternatives for credit and savings that borrowers have in their communities. Since social networks can create both credit (such as informal loans) and savings (Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, ROSCAs) opportunities, evaluating a client's next best alternative is not an easy task. Further research to understand the informal opportunities to borrow and save is essential for understanding the seriousness of the timing problem.
Program & Credit Evaluation Changes
The program itself may change the way it finds new clients. A lender might enter the poorest neighborhoods first, or those closest to the major highway first, and then move on to different areas. The lender may change their credit evaluation process as they become more experienced in the area. For example, the lender could start to check potential clients against lists provided by a credit bureau. Or a seemingly unrelated change could cause the groups to differ, such as a change in the interest rate charged, which could attract a different profile of client (for example, lowering interest rates might attract wealthier clients, who have more financial alternatives). Any of these changes would cause the comparison of current clients to incoming clients to be biased. See Karlan (2001) for further discussion of these issues.
In the data, this problem would exhibit itself similarly to the 'timing of decision' problem. If changes in program and credit evaluation affected the type of client who joined two years ago, then we will observe differences in the baseline data between those who joined initially and those who joined later. We examine this in the empirical section below.
Data
The data used in this study were also collected through the AIMS program but are not related to the cross-sectional studies we discuss here. These longitudinal data were gathered in a more intense exercise to assess impact on individuals who borrow, as well as the effects on their households and microenterprises. 3 We use these data because they allow us to reconstruct the cross-sectional approach with and without the inclusion of dropout, and to compare the profiles of clients who join the program earlier to those who joined later. The sample consists of borrowers from Mibanco, a microfinance institution (MFI) operating in Lima, Peru, and a control group of households which did not borrow from any source but were eligible to receive a Mibanco loan. 4 Two waves of data were collected: a baseline in 1997, and a follow-up on the same households in 1999. In both years two surveys were administered: a household survey that measured variables including employment, education, consumption and savings data at the household level; and a microenterprise survey that gathered data such as profits, assets, and business practices, on up to three microenterprises operated by the household. The variables chosen for 3 More information on AIMS and the data used in this survey can be found at http://www.MicroLinks.org. Data and surveys are also available at this site. 4 To be eligible for a Mibanco loan, the borrower's business must have been in operation for at least six months. this study follow those that Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) measured in the project's final report, which breaks the analysis down into three categories: individual, household and enterprise.
A random sample of borrowers in three credit districts throughout Lima was selected, matching the sectoral composition of the sample to that of Mibanco's entire borrower base. 5 In the baseline survey, the sample consisted of 400 borrower households and 301 non-borrower (control) households. In the second round of data collection, enumerators found 305 original borrower households (76%) and 213 non-borrower households (71%) that agreed to be resurveyed. 6 Of these, 92 households chose to close their microenterprises due to insufficient revenue, lack of capital, illness, death or to take a full-time or salaried job. These households are excluded from the enterprise and individual analysis due to an absence of data, but are included for household variables.
These data allow us to test for dropout bias because they contain dropouts in the 1999 round of the survey and several members of the 1997 control group who began borrowing by 1999. We use the 1999 round of survey data to reproduce the cross-sectional impact analysis, using the 1997 information only to categorize the observations as veterans (Group #1), dropouts (Group #2) and new entrants (Group #3).
The number of observations in each group differs by the level of analysis. Sample sizes are lowest for the individual outcomes (found in Table 3 ) since most of these questions were taken from the enterprise survey and not all primary respondents had enterprises in 1999. The number of observations for the savings variable is higher, as it was asked of all respondents in the household survey. For individuallevel impacts, the primary respondent must be a borrower in a given period for the observation to be categorized as 'borrower.' For household and enterprise-level results (Tables 1 and 2) , if any member of the household has a loan the observation is considered 'borrower' due to fungibility of money within household. Some enterprise impact variables are about the primary enterprise only or aggregated for each 5 See Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) for complete details on the survey process. 6 Slightly over half of the panel leavers could not be located, meaning that the household had moved and their microenterprises either closed or moved. For those that were located, but not surveyed, the most common reason was distrust of the surveyors, although other reasons such as lack of time, being away from the household for extended periods, sickness and death, were also reported.
household, leading to the smaller sample sizes (Panel A). Other enterprise impacts are measured at the firm level (Panel B), leading to significantly more observations since up to three enterprises were recorded per household. For the household data, sample sizes are lower for coping questions, which were only asked of households who had reported a negative economic shock, and for school and intergenerational launching (helping a daughter or son start their own enterprise) questions, which were only asked of households with school age children.
Empirical Analysis

Dropout Bias
In the first analysis, we address the incomplete sample bias and sample attrition bias using the 1999 survey data to construct the impact assessments as a microfinance program would do if they were following the AIMS guidelines (Nelson and Garber 2001) . The 1997 data is only used to identify groups, so that we can compare results excluding dropouts ('cross-sectional approach'), and including dropouts ('adjusted cross-sectional approach'). The cross-sectional methodology compares mean outcomes in 1999
for Group #1 to Group #3, or the veterans to the new entrants. To create the adjusted cross-sectional approach, we replace the Group #1 veterans, with a weighted average of Groups #1 and #2 (veterans and dropouts) in order to include all who were borrowers in 1997, not just those who stayed in the program. Comparing means is equivalent to the following OLS specification:
where T i is an indicator variable equal to one if the weighted observation is from Groups #1 or #2, and is is equal to zero if the observation is from Group #3. Tables 1 through 3 show the results for this analysis, for enterprise outcomes, household outcomes and individual outcomes, respectively. Column 1 shows the mean outcome for the veterans (Group #1), Column 2 shows the mean outcome for the dropouts (Group #2) and Column 3 shows the 7 Weights are used because the sample of dropouts (Group #2) was smaller for this sample than it is estimated to be for the population as a whole. Dropout for non-delinquent Mibanco borrowers is reported as 56% percent in Dunn and Arbuckle (2001, p: 88) .
mean outcome for the new entrants (Group #3). Column 5 then shows the cross-sectional results comparing veterans to new entrants. Column 6 shows the adjusted cross-sectional approach, comparing 'veterans and dropouts' to new entrants. Column 7 reports the t-statistic on the null hypothesis that no dropout bias exists in the cross-sectional methodology.
First, note that for the many of the outcomes no measurable difference is observed between veterans and new entrants. Although the difference between methodologies is often not significant statistically (the sample is very small), there is typically an upward bias for the cross-sectional method without taking dropouts into account.
The most striking change is in the first row of Table 2 shows parallel results, a systematically upward bias to the cross-sectional methodology.
In the first row, Household Income from All Sources, we see a change from 6569 nuevos soles impact to only 2062 nuevos soles impact. Similarly stark differences are found for answers to qualitative questions about coping strategies. The cross-sectional methodology finds borrowers 1% less likely to employ 'bad' coping strategies, such as selling or pawning productive assets, whereas the adjusted methodology finds borrowers 7% more likely to employ bad coping strategies. For poor households, the difference is even starker, going from 0% likely to employ bad strategies to 12%.
Selection Bias
Next, we examine whether the composition of new borrowers changed over the two years, hence invalidating another key assumption of the cross-sectional methodology. This assumption could fail due to the 'timing of life' decision to participate, or due to changes in program placement or credit screening 8 The exchange rate at the time was 3.50, hence this is equivalent to US$1166. 
Conclusion and Recommendation
The purpose of this paper is to make one point: if conducting a cross-sectional impact assessment, then the definition of "veterans" should not be "has been in the program for two years," but rather "joined the program two years ago." This small correction can improve the accuracy and hence reliability of the results. This is not to say all problems are removed, nor to say that a cross-sectional methodology (even one that includes dropouts) would satisfactorily measure the impact of a microcredit program.
Furthermore, although it costs additional money to interview individuals who have left the program, this additional cost buys two things: (1) a more accurate impact assessment, and (2) valuable information on the causes of dropout. We believe the additional expense is money well spent, but exactly how well spent can be investigated empirically.
By replicating our analysis in more settings and determining the size and direction of the bias the microfinance community can get a clearer picture of the pattern of dropouts and the extent to which not including them will affect the results. The dropout rate among Mibanco clients, at 56% over a two-year period for this sample, is quite normal, and it would be especially interesting to see results for MFIs with different dropout rates. If for MFIs with lower dropouts rates the bias is found to be insubstantial, such
MFIs can decide whether it is worthwhile to include dropouts in their analysis. Or, if in certain cases (such as MFIs with low dropout rates) the bias is found to be negative-implying either that dropouts are "successful graduates" or that better-off clients tend to drop out more often-such MFIs could legitimately decide not to include dropouts because, compared to the recalculated approach, the biased results would be a conservative estimate. Until further evidence exists, however, our results make it clear that not including dropouts makes a flawed methodology even more suspect. Although this paper does not discuss these issues, other articles on best practices for MFIs, including the AIMS tools discussed above, (Nelson and Garber 2001) , suggest that systematic interviewing of dropouts can help tremendously with ongoing quality control and improvement of the services the MFI is offering (Micro-Save Africa 2002).
It may be possible to distinguish between "dropouts" and "successful graduates" quantitatively, however. Our sample size did not allow for subgroup analysis, but future researchers could examine the direction of bias by initial income. Indeed, among clients with similar initial incomes, the direction of bias could serve as the very definition of the distinction between the two groups. If the measured impact decreases when dropouts are included, then on average the dropouts are less successful-perhaps because the program is failing them in some way-while if the inclusion of dropouts increases the estimate of impact, then perhaps clients are exiting the program because they feel their needs have been met.
Evidence suggesting one or the other would be enormously valuable to MFIs. Note: Number of observations varies due to missing observations. * This variable has several "does not apply" responses, which causes the large differences in observations for this section. 
